{
  "@context": {
    "@language": "en-us",
    "CIP100": "https://github.com/cardano-foundation/CIPs/blob/master/CIP-0100/README.md#",
    "CIP136": "https://github.com/cardano-foundation/CIPs/blob/master/CIP-0136/README.md#",
    "hashAlgorithm": "CIP100:hashAlgorithm",
    "body": {
      "@id": "CIP136:body",
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        "rationaleStatement": "CIP136:rationaleStatement",
        "precedentDiscussion": "CIP136:precedentDiscussion",
        "counterargumentDiscussion": "CIP136:counterargumentDiscussion",
        "conclusion": "CIP136:conclusion",
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            "unconstitutional": "CIP136:unconstitutional",
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            "againstVote": "CIP136:againstVote"
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  "body": {
    "govActionId": "gov_action105mjyzm3spjppny2m776lwk5jnsuu07uva9tz0yg5u4nkf770rvsql5raht",
    "summary": "Tingvard judges this governance action constitutional.",
    "rationaleStatement": "This governance action is a Treasury Withdrawals action requesting 103,000 ada to reimburse the 100,000 ada deposit associated with the September 2024 “Cardanoの生きがい - Ikigai -” Info governance action, together with an additional 3,000 ada intended to compensate for staking rewards forgone since the original deposit was lost.\n\nThe action satisfies the applicable constitutional requirements under Article II, § 6 and Article II, § 7.\n\nUnder Article II, § 6, the governance action is presented in a standardized and legible format and is supported by immutable governance metadata containing the required information.\n\nUnder Article II, § 7.1, the terms of the withdrawal are sufficiently specified. The purpose is reimbursement of the lost governance-action deposit and associated staking rewards. The payment is intended to occur immediately upon enactment. The relevant cost is the requested 103,000 ada, and the proposal specifies that there are no circumstances under which the withdrawal would be refunded to the Treasury.\n\nThe requirement under Article II, § 7.2 is addressed by the proposal's explicit statement that the recipient has not previously received funds from the Cardano Treasury.\n\nThe requested amount is within the applicable Net Change Limit, satisfying Article II, § 7.3.\n\nArticle II, § 7.4 requires an allocation for periodic independent audits and implementation of oversight metrics regarding the use of Treasury funds. This withdrawal is materially different from a Treasury withdrawal funding an ongoing programme of activities. It is a single, unconditional payment that is completed by the protocol upon enactment. There is no subsequent programme expenditure, milestone delivery, or ongoing use of Treasury funds requiring periodic oversight. The payment, amount, destination, and enactment are all independently verifiable on-chain. Tingvard therefore considers the direct and immutable on-chain record sufficient to satisfy the purpose of the audit and oversight requirement in this specific circumstance, without requiring a separate audit allocation.\n\nArticle II, § 7.5 requires the designation of one or more administrators responsible for monitoring how the funds are used and ensuring the deliverables are achieved. The proposal nominates DReps as Administrator. Tingvard does not consider the DReps to be the appropriate administrator for this purpose. The proposed withdrawal contains no discretionary administration after enactment: the sole deliverable is the immediate payment itself, which is executed and recorded by the Cardano ledger. On these facts, the protocol performs the relevant administrative function by executing and evidencing the payment. The constitutional requirement is therefore satisfied by the protocol's execution of this singular and unconditional withdrawal.\n\nArticle II, § 7.6 applies to ada being held by an administrator prior to further disbursement to the Treasury Withdrawal Recipient. No such intermediate custody occurs here. The funds move directly from the Treasury to the identified recipient upon enactment. Consequently, the custody and delegation requirements of Article II, § 7.6 do not attach to this withdrawal.\n\nThe narrow treatment of Article II, § 7.4 through § 7.6 is justified by the nature of this particular withdrawal. These provisions provide important accountability safeguards for ordinary Treasury-funded programmes involving administrators, expenditure over time, milestones, and deliverables. None of those circumstances exists here. Introducing an intermediary administrator or periodic audit process into a single automated reimbursement would add cost and complexity without providing additional meaningful oversight of the Treasury funds.\n\nTingvard therefore finds that the action satisfies the constitutional requirements applicable to this Treasury Withdrawal.",
    "precedentDiscussion": "This decision establishes that the audit, administration, and custody requirements of Article II, § 7 must be applied with regard to the actual structure of the Treasury Withdrawal.\n\nWhere a withdrawal funds an ongoing programme of work, the requirements of Article II, § 7.4 and § 7.5 provide substantive accountability mechanisms that cannot be replaced merely by the existence of an on-chain transaction.\n\nA materially different situation exists where the entire withdrawal consists of one direct and unconditional payment that is executed by the protocol at enactment. In such a case, there is no continuing treasury-funded activity to administer, monitor, or audit after the transaction has occurred.\n\nArticle II, § 7.6 similarly applies where Treasury funds are held by an administrator before being further distributed to the recipient. A direct Treasury-to-recipient payment does not create such an intermediate custody arrangement.\n\nThis interpretation should therefore be understood narrowly and should not be treated as removing the ordinary accountability requirements from Treasury-funded programmes.",
    "counterargumentDiscussion": "A potential counterargument is that Article II, § 7.4 expressly requires an allocation of ada for periodic independent audits and oversight metrics for Treasury Withdrawals, regardless of the nature of the withdrawal.\n\nTingvard considers the purpose and wording of the requirement in the context of this specific action. The proposed withdrawal is a single payment that is completed at enactment. There are no periodic expenditures or ongoing use of Treasury funds to monitor. The transaction itself provides a permanent and independently verifiable record of the amount and destination of the withdrawal. A separate allocation for periodic auditing would therefore not provide additional meaningful oversight in this circumstance.\n\nA further counterargument is that Article II, § 7.5 requires an administrator to be designated and that the protocol cannot itself be the administrator.\n\nThe proposal nominates DReps as Administrator, but Tingvard does not rely on that designation. The DReps have no continuing role in administering the funds after enactment, and no consent or additional discretionary action is required from them to complete the stated deliverable. The protocol itself executes the payment and provides the definitive evidence that the deliverable has occurred. In this narrowly defined circumstance, the administrative function required by § 7.5 is therefore fulfilled by the protocol.\n\nFinally, it could be argued that Article II, § 7.6 applies to the destination account regardless of whether an administrator holds the funds first. The text of § 7.6, however, specifically addresses ada being held by an administrator prior to further disbursement to the Treasury Withdrawal Recipient. Since no such intermediate holding occurs, the conditions triggering those custody requirements are absent.",
    "conclusion": "Tingvard finds the proposed “Reimburse Ikigai Info Governance Action Deposit” Treasury Withdrawals Governance Action constitutional under Article II, § 6 and Article II, § 7.1 through § 7.6.\n\nThe withdrawal is a single, immediate, and objectively verifiable reimbursement. Its direct execution by the Cardano protocol means that no ongoing treasury administration, periodic audit allocation, or intermediate administrator custody is required in this specific circumstance.",
    "internalVote": {
      "constitutional": 4,
      "unconstitutional": 0,
      "abstain": 0,
      "didNotVote": 1,
      "againstVote": 0
    },
    "references": [
      {
        "@type": "RelevantArticles",
        "label": "Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Constitution",
        "uri": "ipfs://bafkreieyuknozbtewyurfqoagvplvykadn6a4u6wglupavdz46bbsnnl6e"
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  "authors": [
    {
      "name": "Tingvard",
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