{"@context":{"@language":"en-us","CIP100":"https://github.com/cardano-foundation/CIPs/blob/master/CIP-0100/README.md#","CIP129":"https://github.com/cardano-foundation/CIPs/blob/master/CIP-0129/README.md#","CIP136":"https://github.com/cardano-foundation/CIPs/blob/master/CIP-0136/README.md#","hashAlgorithm":"CIP100:hashAlgorithm","body":{"@id":"CIP136:body","@context":{"govActionId":"CIP129:governance-action-identifiers","references":{"@id":"CIP100:references","@container":"@set","@context":{"GovernanceMetadata":"CIP100:GovernanceMetadataReference","Other":"CIP100:OtherReference","label":"CIP100:reference-label","uri":"CIP100:reference-uri","RelevantArticles":"CIP136:RelevantArticles"}},"summary":"CIP136:summary","rationaleStatement":"CIP136:rationaleStatement","precedentDiscussion":"CIP136:precedentDiscussion","counterargumentDiscussion":"CIP136:counterargumentDiscussion","conclusion":"CIP136:conclusion","internalVote":{"@id":"CIP136:internalVote","@container":"@set","@context":{"constitutional":"CIP136:constitutional","unconstitutional":"CIP136:unconstitutional","abstain":"CIP136:abstain","didNotVote":"CIP136:didNotVote","againstVote":"CIP136:againstVote"}}}},"authors":{"@id":"CIP100:authors","@container":"@set","@context":{"did":"@id","name":"http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/name","witness":{"@id":"CIP100:witness","@context":{"witnessAlgorithm":"CIP100:witnessAlgorithm","publicKey":"CIP100:publicKey","signature":"CIP100:signature"}}}}},"hashAlgorithm":"blake2b-256","body":{"govActionId":"gov_action1znt2fr0chyye50nj0cdld2dvdjg3xsdfvq0fr37n43uehlvfkqdsqjnuq3n","summary":"The Cardano Foundation votes NO. We recognize that credit markets are an underdeveloped area on Cardano, however this proposal does not show that a lack of this infrastructure is what holds institutional credit back.","rationaleStatement":"A [PDF version][pdf-link] of this rationale is also made available.\n\n[pdf-link]: https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmaEnrXwiogPuP2iss84tFGKS6EFpYedcPDL8spQyo97MW\n\nWe recognize the aim of bringing real-world credit to Cardano. Having assessed this governance action, we do not see the business case for this proposal as a worthwhile use of treasury funds. Our decision is driven by the following factors:\n\n* **Neither demand nor a path to use is shown.** The proposal names no lending protocol, originator or capital provider committed to the standard, presents no indication of support for the new metadata standard or market demand. The work ends with a testnet demonstration that requires no integration with an existing third-party lending protocol, with no mainnet deployment and no commitment to maintain the software after month five.   \n\n* **The treasury would fund the first phase of a commercial venture.** The AURORA website presents this withdrawal as Phase 1 (\"get the AURORA infrastructure funded\"), followed by a Seed round and a \"future regulated layer\", and describes the standardized market as \"the core data and network effect of the business\". The treasury would bear the earliest-stage risk, while any commercial upside would sit with the venture and its future investors.  \n\n* **The budget cannot be traced to the work.** 800,000 ada is a fixed fee to Fairway with no breakdown by workstream or role, and the proposal states that the fee is paid “rather than reimbursed against Fairway’s actual internal costs”. What the consortium partners receive is not disclosed, and the milestone envelopes do not separate Fairway's fee from third-party costs. The administrators may also reallocate review, hosting and contingency funds as additional implementation payments to Fairway.  \n\n* **Acceptance criteria are unclear.** Acceptance rests on whether outputs \"reasonably satisfy\" the criteria, as judged by administrators the proposal describes as \"independent from the implementation consortium\", yet the recipient's own website lists one of them as an advisor. The conflicts disclosure does not address this relationship. Further, milestone payments are provided in advance. While this is not an issue alone, together with unclear milestone acceptance criteria and other factors mentioned above, advance payments create additional risk for the treasury on the delivery front.","conclusion":"The Cardano Foundation votes NO.","references":[{"@type":"RelevantArticles","label":"Cardano Constitution","uri":"ipfs://bafkreieyuknozbtewyurfqoagvplvykadn6a4u6wglupavdz46bbsnnl6e"},{"@type":"GovernanceMetadata","label":"Proposal Metadata Anchor URI","uri":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/fairway-global/aurora-proposal/refs/heads/main/data.jsonld"},{"@type":"GovernanceMetadata","label":"Proposal Metadata Anchor Hash","uri":"2791bc5d48adfdb1d56b072891cfe0cd1e7235941e157d3c45774ea29b468fb1"},{"@type":"Other","label":"“Our Cardano” by the Cardano Foundation","uri":"https://cardanofoundation.org/our-cardano"},{"@type":"Other","label":"Rationale PDF","uri":"ipfs://QmaEnrXwiogPuP2iss84tFGKS6EFpYedcPDL8spQyo97MW"}]},"authors":[{"name":"Cardano Foundation"}]}