{ "@context": { "@language": "en-us", "CIP100": "https://github.com/cardano-foundation/CIPs/blob/master/CIP-0100/README.md#", "CIP136": "https://github.com/cardano-foundation/CIPs/blob/master/CIP-0136/README.md#", "hashAlgorithm": "CIP100:hashAlgorithm", "body": { "@id": "CIP136:body", "@context": { "references": { "@id": "CIP100:references", "@container": "@set", "@context": { "GovernanceMetadata": "CIP100:GovernanceMetadataReference", "Other": "CIP100:OtherReference", "label": "CIP100:reference-label", "uri": "CIP100:reference-uri", "RelevantArticles": "CIP136:RelevantArticles" } }, "summary": "CIP136:summary", "rationaleStatement": "CIP136:rationaleStatement", "precedentDiscussion": "CIP136:precedentDiscussion", "counterargumentDiscussion": "CIP136:counterargumentDiscussion", "conclusion": "CIP136:conclusion", "internalVote": { "@id": "CIP136:internalVote", "@container": "@set", "@context": { "constitutional": "CIP136:constitutional", "unconstitutional": "CIP136:unconstitutional", "abstain": "CIP136:abstain", "didNotVote": "CIP136:didNotVote", "againstVote": "CIP136:againstVote" } } } }, "authors": { "@id": "CIP100:authors", "@container": "@set", "@context": { "did": "@id", "name": "http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/name", "witness": { "@id": "CIP100:witness", "@context": { "witnessAlgorithm": "CIP100:witnessAlgorithm", "publicKey": "CIP100:publicKey", "signature": "CIP100:signature" } } } } }, "hashAlgorithm": "blake2b-256", "body": { "govActionId": "gov_action174lclj6wswk3km6chl755vp24ja44yy8fjput7z20795hdpuax7qq67pvcp", "summary": "Tingvard judges this governance action unconstitutional.", "rationaleStatement": "This governance action is a Treasury Withdrawals action requesting ₳4,207,967 over a twelve-month period to fund a Governance Incentives Framework, including research, governance data infrastructure, incentive modelling, community engagement, a controlled incentive pilot, and a proposed Governance Incentives Framework CIP.\n\nTingvard finds the action unconstitutional on two independent grounds concerning the accountability and custody requirements applicable to Treasury Withdrawals under Article II, § 7.\n\nFirst, Article II, § 7.5 requires a Treasury Withdrawals action to designate one or more administrators responsible for monitoring how the funds are used and ensuring that the deliverables are achieved. The proposal allocates funds to administration, audit and oversight support and describes reporting and auditing processes, but it does not designate a person, organization, company, or other identifiable administrator responsible for these duties.\n\nFunding an oversight function is not equivalent to designating the party accountable for performing it. The constitutional requirement is that the administrator be designated by the Treasury Withdrawals action itself. Without such a designation, the Community cannot determine before voting who is responsible for monitoring the use of the funds or ensuring that the stated deliverables are achieved. The action therefore fails Article II, § 7.5.\n\nSecond, Article II, § 7.6 requires ada received from a Treasury withdrawal, while held prior to further disbursement to the Treasury Withdrawal Recipient, to be kept in separate accounts auditable by the Cardano Community. Such accounts must not be delegated to an SPO and must be delegated to the predefined abstain voting option.\n\nThe withdrawal destination identified by the action is a key-hash stake account controlled by the proposers. The account is not delegated to an SPO, but it is also not delegated to the predefined abstain voting option. Article II, § 7.6 specifies delegation to the predefined abstain voting option as a requirement, rather than merely requiring that the account refrain from voting.\n\nTingvard therefore finds that the custody arrangement does not satisfy Article II, § 7.6.\n\nThese findings concern the constitutional terms under which the Treasury may be withdrawn, rather than the merits of the proposed governance-incentives research. The deficiencies are potentially curable through a revised action that clearly designates the responsible administrator and directs the treasury funds to an appropriate account satisfying the custody and delegation requirements.", "precedentDiscussion": "This decision affirms that Article II, § 7.5 requires an actual designation of the administrator responsible for monitoring treasury funds and ensuring delivery of the proposed activities. Allocating funds for administration, audit, or oversight does not itself satisfy that requirement.\n\nIt also establishes that the custody requirements of Article II, § 7.6 must be assessed against the account identified in the withdrawal arrangement. Delegation to the predefined abstain voting option is an explicit constitutional requirement and cannot be replaced by simply leaving the account undelegated.\n\nThese requirements serve different purposes. Article II, § 7.5 establishes accountability for the administration of treasury funds, while Article II, § 7.6 establishes specific safeguards for treasury funds held before further disbursement. Both must be satisfied where applicable.", "counterargumentDiscussion": "A counterargument is that the proposal clearly contemplates oversight through its dedicated administration, audit and oversight allocation, public reporting, financial reconciliation, and auditor involvement. This demonstrates an intention to provide accountability.\n\nHowever, Article II, § 7.5 requires the Treasury Withdrawals action to designate one or more administrators responsible for monitoring the funds and ensuring that deliverables are achieved. An oversight structure that does not identify the party carrying this constitutional responsibility does not satisfy the requirement. The Community should know who is accountable before it votes on the withdrawal.\n\nA further counterargument is that Article II, § 7.6 refers specifically to ada being held by an administrator prior to further disbursement to the Treasury Withdrawal Recipient. It could therefore be argued that where funds are transferred directly to the recipient, the custody requirements do not apply.\n\nTingvard does not accept this interpretation. Reading the provision in this manner would create a distinction where a treasury withdrawal using an administrator would be subject to explicit custody safeguards while a direct withdrawal to a proposer-controlled account would avoid them. The constitutional requirement to use a separate, auditable account and delegate it to the predefined abstain voting option is intended to safeguard treasury ada during its custody and administration, and should not be rendered inapplicable merely by structuring the withdrawal as a direct payment.", "conclusion": "Tingvard finds the proposed Governance Incentives Framework 2026 Treasury Withdrawals action unconstitutional under Article II, § 7.5 and Article II, § 7.6. The action does not designate the administrator responsible for monitoring the funds and deliverables, and the identified destination account is not delegated to the predefined abstain voting option as required by the Constitution.", "internalVote": { "constitutional": 0, "unconstitutional": 4, "abstain": 0, "didNotVote": 1, "againstVote": 0 }, "references": [ { "@type": "RelevantArticles", "label": "Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Constitution", "uri": "ipfs://bafkreieyuknozbtewyurfqoagvplvykadn6a4u6wglupavdz46bbsnnl6e" } ] }, "authors": [ { "name": "Tingvard", "imageUrl": "ipfs://QmPkHXdK6GLtDNyyKFBWRwARFEy9TPFcbpDganixmRXwWJ" } ] }